russiaN INTERESTS
Russia's primary interest in Eurasia is maintaining a buffer zone around its borders. Historically, Moscow acquired this cushion by annexing territory in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The collapse of the Soviet Union reverted the scope of Moscow's territorial control to seventeenth century levels.
The 1991 dissolution of the U.S.S.R. renders Russia deeply insecure. At the height of the Cold War, NATO's reach terminated over 1000 miles from St. Petersburg. Today, Russia's second largest city is just 70 miles from the Western alliance's front line. Moscow uses this vulnerability as a pretext for interventions in places like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
It is unlikely that Russia will recreate an exact copy of the Soviet Union. However, Russia is taking steps to preserve the political, economic, and security networks that existed before 1991. This means opening the post-Soviet republics to Moscow and closing them off to other powers. During the War in Afghanistan, Western powers set up bases in Central Asia and used Russian airspace with Kremlin permission. Now Russia can block foreign deployments to CSTO states. Russia also seeks to retain its dominant position in the European energy market, even if it means aggression against other states. Conceding energy dominance means loss of significant leverage in dealing with Europe.
The maps below illustrate Russia's position in Eurasia and seek to explain Russia's policies towards other countries in the region:
The 1991 dissolution of the U.S.S.R. renders Russia deeply insecure. At the height of the Cold War, NATO's reach terminated over 1000 miles from St. Petersburg. Today, Russia's second largest city is just 70 miles from the Western alliance's front line. Moscow uses this vulnerability as a pretext for interventions in places like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
It is unlikely that Russia will recreate an exact copy of the Soviet Union. However, Russia is taking steps to preserve the political, economic, and security networks that existed before 1991. This means opening the post-Soviet republics to Moscow and closing them off to other powers. During the War in Afghanistan, Western powers set up bases in Central Asia and used Russian airspace with Kremlin permission. Now Russia can block foreign deployments to CSTO states. Russia also seeks to retain its dominant position in the European energy market, even if it means aggression against other states. Conceding energy dominance means loss of significant leverage in dealing with Europe.
The maps below illustrate Russia's position in Eurasia and seek to explain Russia's policies towards other countries in the region:
by the numbers
37,300 Russian troops in "the Near Abroad:"
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia): 7,000 troops
Armenia (CSTO): 3,300 troops
Crimea (Ukraine): 20,000 troops
Kyrgyzstan (CSTO): 500 troops
Tajikistan (CSTO): 5,000 troops
Transnistria (Moldova): 1,500 troops
(Other Russian personnel and facilities stationed in Belarus, East Ukraine, and Kazakhstan)
Percent (%) of natural gas supplies received from Russia among European Union states:
Finland: 100%
Estonia: 100%
Latvia: 100%
Lithuania: 100%
Slovakia: 98%
Bulgaria: 92%
Czech Republic: 77.6%
Greece: 76%
Hungary: 60%
Slovenia: 52%
Austria: 49%
Poland: 48.15%
Germany: 36%
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia): 7,000 troops
Armenia (CSTO): 3,300 troops
Crimea (Ukraine): 20,000 troops
Kyrgyzstan (CSTO): 500 troops
Tajikistan (CSTO): 5,000 troops
Transnistria (Moldova): 1,500 troops
(Other Russian personnel and facilities stationed in Belarus, East Ukraine, and Kazakhstan)
Percent (%) of natural gas supplies received from Russia among European Union states:
Finland: 100%
Estonia: 100%
Latvia: 100%
Lithuania: 100%
Slovakia: 98%
Bulgaria: 92%
Czech Republic: 77.6%
Greece: 76%
Hungary: 60%
Slovenia: 52%
Austria: 49%
Poland: 48.15%
Germany: 36%